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This paper seeks to contribute to the relatively scarce published research on the relationship 
between bank efficiency and European integration in the wake of the recent financial crisis. 
Using Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Data Envelopment Analysis approaches, the study 
estimates bank efficiency for different panels of European Union countries during the time 
period 1994-2008. The main conclusions point to the persistence of inefficiencies, which 
decreased with the implementation of the European Monetary Union (in the time period 2000-
2008) but then increased slightly in the most recent phase (2004-2008), during which the EU 
had to adapt to the new universe of 27 member-states. On the other hand, there is evidence of 
a convergence process, although this is very slow and not strong enough to avoid the 
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Efficiency and integration in European banking markets 
 
1. Introduction 
The European banking institutions play a unique role in the context of the European Monetary 
Union, as the increase of competition in all financial-product market segments is expected to 
contribute to price and cost reductions and benefit the exploitation of scale economies.  
In recent years, financial systems have been experiencing the consequences of the strong 
imbalances and turbulence caused by the US sub-prime mortgage market, which affected 
different segments of the international money and credit markets and revealed the fragility of 
many financial institutions, including some EU banking institutions and markets.  
The ensuing crisis drew attention to the importance of studies seeking to identify the factors 
explaining the weaknesses in the financial systems at national and international levels. There 
is already a large strand of literature on the analysis of the determinants of efficiency and 
particularly on the empirical measurement of the profit and cost efficiency in banking (among 
others, Altunbas et al., 2001; Goddard et al. 2001, 2007; Williams and Nguyen, 2005; 
Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Barros et al. 2007; Berger, 2007; Hughes and Mester, 2008; 
Sturm and Williams, 2010).   
Nevertheless, in Europe there is no clear consensus on the evidence of increasing 
consolidation and integration of the European markets. Some empirical studies conclude that 
there is evidence of integration, particularly of the European money market, but also to some 
extent of the bond and equity markets (Cabral et al., 2002; Hartmann et al., 2003; Guiso et al., 
2004; Manna, 2004; Cappiello et al., 2006; Bos and Schmiedel, 2007).  Other empirical 
contributions have concluded that the European financial markets are as yet far from 3 
 
achieving integration (Gardener et al., 2002; Schure et al., 2004; Dermine, 2006; European 
Central Bank, 2007, 2008; Gropp and Kashyap, 2008; Affinito and Farabullini, 2009).  
However, there are not many references to studies that have clearly addressed the relationship 
between banking efficiency and European integration. The main examples are to be found in 
Tortosa-Ausina (2002), Murinde et al., (2004), Holló and Nagy (2006), Weill (2004, 2009) 
and Casu and Girardone (2009, 2010). 
 
This paper follows this latter strand of literature and tests banking efficiency across EU 
countries in the wake of the recent crisis, using both Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) estimates and comparing the results obtained for a panel 
comprising the “old” EU-15 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK) 
and another panel comprising all of the current EU-27 members. The main conclusions point 
to the existence of statistically important technical inefficiencies that increased slightly after 
2004 with the inclusion of the 12 new member-states. The obtained country efficiency 
rankings also allow us to conclude that countries that performed well in the EU-15 panel 
maintain their strong positions in the enlarged EU-27 panel. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
convergence process with the estimation of a beta-convergence model clearly shows that 
while there is convergence in banking efficiency across EU countries, it is a very slow process 
and not only the new member-states but also some of the “old” EU countries are still facing 
difficulties in adapting to the new market conditions. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and a brief 
literature review; the methodology and the data are presented in Section 3; Section 4 reports 




2. Theoretical framework and brief literature review 
Whilst European research on bank efficiency has not yet matched the record of the US 
contributions, it has increased enormously over recent years, following the dynamic changes 
in the structure of European banking. 
There is a strand of literature that focuses on the heterogeneities across banks, explaining 
them by such differences in the performance conditions as technological progress (Wheelock 
and Wilson, 1999; Berger, 2003; Casu et al., 2004), bank size (Altunbas et al., 2001; 
Molyneux, 2003; Bikker et al., 2006; Schaeck and Cihak, 2007), bank ownership  (Bonin et 
al., 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Lensink et al., 2008), bank mergers (Diaz et al., 2004; 
Campa and Hernando, 2006; Altunbas and Marquês, 2007), financial deregulation 
(Kumbhakar et al., 2001; Vives, 2001; Goddard et al., 2007) and legal tradition (Berger et al. 
2001; Beck et al., 2003-a, 2003-b; Barros et al., 2007). 
The study of bank efficiency is usually based on the assumption that the performance of each 
individual bank can be described by a production function that links banking outputs to the 
necessary banking inputs. However, there is no consensus concerning the definition of these 
banking outputs and inputs. The discussion is mainly on the specific role of deposits, since 
they may be considered either as inputs or as outputs of the production function. 
According to the production approach, banks provide services related to loans and deposits 
and, like the other producers, they use labour and capital as inputs of a given production 
function (see among others, Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Resti, 1997; Rossi et al., 2005).  
The intermediation approach considers that banks are mainly intermediaries between those 
economic agents with excess financing capacity and those that need support for their 
investments. Banks attract deposits and other funds and, using labour and other types of inputs 
such as buildings, equipment, or technology, they transform these funds into loans and 5 
 
investment securities. This approach has been used, for instance, by Sealey and Lindley 
(1977), Berger and Mester (1997), Altunbas et al. (2001), Bos and Kool (2006) and Barros et 
al. (2007). 
The research into efficiency, either by the production approach or by the intermediation 
approach, is based on the estimation of an efficiency frontier with the best combinations of the 
different inputs and outputs of the production process and then on the analysis of the 
deviations from the frontier that correspond to the losses of efficiency. Most of the empirical 
studies on the measurement of bank efficiencies adopt either parametric methods, like the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), or non-parametric methods, particularly the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
The SFA estimates efficiency based on economic optimisation (maximisation of profits or 
minimisation of costs), given the assumption of a stochastic optimal frontier. It follows the 
pioneering contribution of Farrel (1957) and has been further developed by such authors as 
Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), Stevenson (1980), Battese and 
Coelli (1988, 1992, 1995), Frerier and Lowell (1990), Coelli et al. (1998),  Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000) and Altunbas et al. (2001).   
According to Altunbas et al. (2001), the single equation stochastic cost function model can be 
represented with the following expression:  ε + = ) , ( j i P Q TC TC ; where TC is the  total cost, Q 
is the vector of outputs, P is the input-price vector and ε is the error (a formal presentation of 
the cost function for panel data models is presented in Appendix I).   
The error of this cost function can be decomposed into v u + = ε ; where u and v are 
independently distributed. The first part of this sum, u, is assumed to be a positive 
disturbance, capturing the effects of the inefficiency or the weaknesses in managerial 
performance. It is distributed as half-normal and is truncated at zero,  ( ) [ ]
2 , ~ u u σ µ
+ Ν ,  with 
non-zero µ mean, as each unit´s production must lie on or below its production frontier, but 6 
 
above zero. The second part of the error, v, is assumed to be distributed as two-sided normal, 
with zero mean and variance 
2
v σ  and it represents the random disturbances. 
As the estimation of the presented cost function provides only the value of the error term, ε, 
the value of the inefficient term, u, has to be obtained indirectly. Following  Jondrow et al. 
(1982) and Greene (1993, 2003), the total variance can be expressed as 
2 2 2
v u σ σ σ + = where 






















λ = is a measure of the relative contribution of the inefficient term.  
The variance ratio parameter γ, which relates the variability of u to total variability

















=  ; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. If γ is close to zero, the differences in the 
cost will be entirely related to statistical noise, while a γ close to one reveals the presence of 
technical inefficiency. 
One important advantage of SFA is that in the event of our including a variable that is not 
relevant, this variable will have a very low weighting in the calculation of the efficiency 
scores, so its impact will be negligible. This is an important difference from DEA, where the 
weights for a variable are usually unconstrained. Another advantage of the econometric 
frontier is that it allows the decomposition of deviations from efficient levels between the 
stochastic shocks or the noise (v) and pure inefficiency (u), whereas DEA classifies the whole 
deviation as inefficiency. 
Again following the proposals of Farrel (1957), the non-parametric approach was developed 
by Charnes et al. (1978), who first used the term DEA, and continues to be used by many 
authors, as is well-documented in the detailed reviews provided by Thanassoulis et al. (2008) 
and Cook and Seiford (2009).  7 
 
Fundamentally, DEA is a mathematical programming approach which is based on the 
microeconomic concept of efficiency and the microeconomic view of production functions 
(see Appendix II for a more formal presentation). In DEA, the production function is, 
however, generated from the actual data for the evaluated units and not determined by any 
specific functional form.  
Taking the available data, the DEA frontier will be defined by the piecewise linear segments 
that represent the combinations of the best-practice observations, the measurement of 
efficiency being relative to the particular frontier obtained. If the actual production of one 
decision-making unit (DMU) lies on the frontier, this production unit will be considered 
perfectly efficient, whereas if it is situated below the frontier, the DMU will be inefficient; the 
ratio of the actual to the potential level of production will define the level of efficiency of any 
individual DMU.  
Thus, with the DEA approach, the efficiency score for any DMU is not defined absolutely in 
comparison with a universal efficiency standard; rather, it is always defined as the distance to 
the particular production frontier, that is, in relation to the other DMUs that are included in the 
specific data set. As a consequence, DEA provides efficiency scores even in the presence of 
relatively few observations, which represents a great advantage of DEA in comparison with 
the parametric approaches (like the SFA), as these require the availability of sufficient 
observations to allow the estimation of specific production functions.     
Solving a linear optimisation problem (see Appendix II), the DEA approach provides, for 
every i DMU, a scalar efficiency score (θi  ≤ 1). If θi = 1, the DMU lies on the efficient 
frontier and will be considered an efficient unit. On the contrary, if θi < 1, the DMU lies 
below the efficient frontier and will be considered an inefficient unit; moreover, (1- θi) will 
always be the measure of its inefficiency.  
 8 
 
3. Methodology and used data 
Considering the aims of European integration to increase competition in all financial-product 
segments, to contribute to price and cost reductions and to benefit bank efficiency, we will use 
both SFA and DEA techniques to test the existence of bank inefficiency across EU countries. 
We will also investigate whether there any remarkable differences in the bank efficiency 
patterns of the “old” EU-15 members in comparison with the universe of all EU-27 countries. 
We will follow the intermediation approach and  specify a Stochastic Cost Frontier (SCF) 
model, using a linear cost function with three outputs (loans, securities and other earning 
assets) and the price of three inputs (borrowed funds, physical capital and labour) to estimate 
the following translog form of a cost function:  
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Where: 
   C = total cost (i = 1,..., N = number of the countries included in each panel; t = 
1,...,T = time period) 
  w = inputs (h,k = 1, ..., H) 
  y = outputs (r,s = 1, ..., R) 
    
      
 Our data are sourced from the Bankscope database. The sample comprises annual data from 
the consolidated accounts of the commercial and savings banks of all EU countries between 
1994 and 2008.  In Appendix III, we present the number of banks of each country in 1994, 
2000 and 2008 and also the average number of the entire period (1994-2008). 
 
We define the input prices and the outputs (quantities) of the cost function using the following 
variables: 
•  Dependent variable = Total cost (TC) = natural logarithm of the sum of the 
interest expenses plus the total operating expenses  
 9 
 
•  Outputs:  
o  Y1 = Total loans = natural logarithm of the loans 
o  Y2 = Total securities = natural logarithm of the total securities 
o  Y3 = Other earning assets = natural logarithm of the difference between the 
total earning assets and the total loans 
 
•  Inputs: 
o  W1  = Price of borrowed funds = natural logarithm of the ratio interest 
expenses over the sum of deposits 
o  W2 = Price of physical capital = natural logarithm of the ratio non-interest 
expenses over fixed assets 
o  W3 = Price of labour = natural logarithm of the ratio personnel expenses 
over the number of employees 
 
•  Other variables:  
o   Z1 = Number of banks = natural logarithm of the number of banks included 
in the panels 
o   Z2 = Equity ratio  = natural logarithm of the ratio equity over total assets 
o   Z3 = Ratio revenue over expenses = natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
total revenue  over the  total expenses 
 
 
In our estimations, we consider two sets of EU countries:  
•  EU-15 – comprising the 15 “old” EU member-states: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.  
 
•  EU-27 – all current EU member-states. 
 
 
In order to test the degrees of convergence among each of the two panels of countries, we use 
the predicted values of efficiency obtained with the estimated stochastic cost frontier model 
and, borrowing from economic growth theory, we estimate the following beta-convergence 
model:  
[] 2                           
1
, 1 , ∑
=
− + + + = ∆
n
i
t i i t i D BE BE ε β α  
Where:   BEi,t = bank efficiency in country i (i = 1, ...n) in year t (t = 1, ... T) 
  ∆ BE= BEi,t - BEi,t-1   
 D i = country dummies  
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Finally, being aware that during the last decade, the EU’s structural changes were due both to 
the historically remarkable enlargement process and to the implementation of the EMU, we 
also use the DEA approach to test the cross-country differences and compare the average 
DEA input-oriented efficiency measures for the EU-15 and the EU-27 panels during three 
specific time intervals: 1994-2008, 2000-2008 and 2004-2008. 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
Appendix IV presents the results obtained with SFA, more precisely with stochastic cost 
frontier (SCF) functions for both the EU-15 and the EU-27 panels during the time period 
1994-2008.  We report the results of two estimated models
1: one following the cost model 
presented above and the other being a simplified cost model, in which we include only the 
statistically important variables.  
The provided information on the Wald tests and the log of the likelihood allow us to conclude 
that in all panels, the specified cost function fits the data well and the null hypothesis that 
there is no inefficiency component is rejected. Furthermore, in all situations the frontier 
parameters are statistically significant (see the bottom lines of Appendix IV).  
The high values of the mean, µ, of the first part of the cost function’s error, capturing the 
effects of the inefficiency, as defined above, indicates that in all circumstances (see Table 1, 
below, with values taken from Appendix IV), technical inefficiencies exist and they are 
always statistically important. This means that the use of a traditional cost function with no 
technical inefficiency effects would not be an adequate representation of the data.  
A more careful observation of the values provided in Table 1 allows us to conclude that 
inefficiencies increased with the inclusion of the new EU member-states, reflecting some 11 
 
possible difficulties of the EU banking institutions in the process of adaptation to the new 
conditions of the enlarged market. 
 
TABLE 1 – Summary of the obtained results for the mean, µ 
 
Variable  EU-15  EU-27 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II 
mu        
coefficient  2.952165 2.8636 3.533474  3.254799 
z  6.50 7.00 8.85 9.40 
P>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
 
The presence of inefficiency is also confirmed by the high values of the contribution of the 









= , reported in Table 
2, reveal that in all panels the inefficient error term amounts to around 98%. This implies that 
the variation of the total cost among the different EU countries was almost solely due to the 
differences in their cost inefficiencies.  
 
TABLE 2 – Summary of the obtained results for the contribution of the inefficient 
error term to total variance, γ 
 
Variable  EU-15  EU-27 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II 
gamma        
Coefficient .9743051  .9769977 .9803236  .9796408 
Standard error .0118859 0.0102856 .0057757  .0059013 
 
 
The previous results are confirmed by the comparison of the values of the variances of the 
inefficient error term (σu) and the random disturbances (σv), which are presented in Table 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 Other models were estimated to check the validity of these results. They include different combinations of the 
outputs, inputs and their products and the obtained results will be provided on request.  12 
 
In all situations, the variance is mostly due to the inefficient term and the EU-15 panel is 
revealed to be much more homogeneous than the EU-27 panel.  
  
TABLE 3 – Summary of the obtained results for the variance of the inefficient 
error term (σu) and the noise (σv)  
 
Variable  EU-15  EU-27 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II 
sigma_u2        
Coefficient  .1665279 .1873025  .3809868 .3708549 
Standard error  .0754535 .0819444  .1097962  .105689 
        
sigma_v2        
Coefficient  .0043918 .0044098  .0076469 .0077072 




According to the estimation results of the cost function, also displayed in Appendix IV, we 
can see that in all situations, the total cost (more precisely, the sum of interest expenses plus 
the operating expenses) increases mostly with the price of the borrowed funds (W1, here 
represented by the ratio interest expenses over the sum of the deposits). However, the contrary 
appears likely to have occurred with the other two inputs: the price of capital (W2, with the 
proxy ratio of the non-interest expenses over fixed assets) and the price of labour (W3, the 
ratio personnel expenses over the number of employees). This may be due either to the chosen 
proxies or to the decreasing importance of the traditional production factors in bank activities. 
On the other hand, as expected, the total cost always increases with the provided securities 
(Y2) and the other earning assets (Y3, here the difference between the earning assets and the 
total loans). As for the other output, total loans (Y1), they clearly also increase the total cost, 
but only in the EU-27 panel. 
With regard to the other explanatory variables, the results are statistically significant only for 
the equity ratio (Z2, equity over total assets) and for the ratio revenue over expenses (Z3), 13 
 
thereby confirming our expectations: total cost clearly increases with the equity ratio and 
decreases with the revenue over expenses ratio. 
 
From the residuals of the estimated cost frontier functions (Model I of Appendix IV), we also 
obtain the country efficiency scores, which are presented in Appendix V.  For each panel, the 
100% result is obtained by the country with the best practice, that is, the country with least 
waste in its production process. All the other countries are classified in relation to each 
panel´s benchmark. 
Again according to the results reported in Appendix V, we see that the inclusion of the new 
EU member-states produces a very small decrease in the mean score and the median of cost 
efficiency and slightly increases the standard deviation. Regarding the country efficiency 
scores, the results for the EU-27 panel clearly show that the all of the 12 “new” member-states 
are situated below the mean efficiency. However, there are also three “old” members 
(specifically, Austria, Portugal and Greece) which not only have the worst scores in the EU-
15 panel, but also occupy low positions in the EU-27 ranking, indeed obtaining worse results 
than some of the “new” member-states.  
 
In order to test the degrees of convergence within the two panels of countries, we use the 
predicted values of efficiency obtained with the estimated cost model (Model II of Appendix 
IV) to estimate the previously-presented beta-convergence model (see equation [2]). 
Borrowing from economic growth theory, we know that a negative value of the estimated 
betas reveals convergence and that the higher is beta, the faster will the convergence process 
be.  
The results obtained with our model are reported in Table 4 (we have omitted the results for 
the country dummies, but they will be provided on request). 14 
 
 
Table 4 – β-Convergence estimates  
  PANEL 1 - 15 EU countries  PANEL 2 - 27 EU countries 
Constant:    
coefficient  0.3084647     0.3128859    
t  3.85     6.12    
P>|t| 0.000  0.000 
β:    
coefficient  -0.1335495  -0.141474    
t  -3.70     -5.95    
P>|t| 0.000  0.000 
    
R-squared    0.1147  0.1638 
N 210  378 
 
From the results reported in Table 4, we can conclude that there is a convergence process 
across EU countries in both panels, since the values of the estimated betas are statistically 
significant and negative but they are relatively small, revealing that this convergence is not a 
very fast process.  
 
Appendix VI presents the results obtained with the input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) which, as was mentioned earlier, does not require the specification of a functional 
form. In our estimations, we use the same three inputs (borrowed funds, physical capital and 
labour, as defined previously) and the same three outputs (total loans, total securities and 
other earning assets). In this case, a perfectly efficient country will be situated on the efficient 
frontier, which is defined, for each panel, with the combinations of the best-practice 
observations of the panel. In addition, the relative measure of any country´s inefficiency will 
be its distance from the efficient frontier. 
As expected, the DEA efficiency scores are lower than those obtained with the estimation of 
the Stochastic Cost Frontier (SCF), since DEA does not allow for the decomposition between 
“pure” technical inefficiency and “noise”. Now there is a clearer decrease of the average 
efficiency score in the EU-27 panel, compared to the EU-15 panel (from 80% to 74%). The 15 
 
median also declines from 78% to 75%, while the standard deviation increases from 16.2% to 
22.7%.  
Table 5 below allows the comparison between the country efficiency rankings which were 
obtained with both the estimated SCF and DEA estimations. In spite of the methodological 
differences, there are only few remarkable changes in the countries’ ranking positions. For 
instance, Finland is very well classified with the SCF, but falls dramatically with the DEA 
estimations. However, it is worth noting that according to the data presented in Appendix III, 
the Finnish banks represent, on average, only around 0.5% of all considered banks. Generally 
speaking, Table 5 shows that for some of the more representative  countries, even when the 
ranking position is not exactly the same, a good score with the SCF is almost always 
confirmed with a similarly good position with DEA (and vice versa).  
 
Table 5 – SCF and DEA country efficiency rankings  
  EU-15 EU-27 
  SCF DEA SCF DEA 
1 Ireland  Ireland  Finland    Estonia 
2 Finland    Portugal  Ireland  Ireland 
3 Denmark  Spain  Denmark  Malta 
4 Netherlands  UK  Sweden  Slovakia 
5 Sweden  Italy  Netherlands  Spain 
6 UK  Greece  UK  Slovenia 
7 Spain  Belgium  Luxembourg  Romania 
8 Luxembourg Austria  Belgium  UK 
9 Belgium  Netherlands  Spain  Italy 
10 Italy  Denmark  France  Cyprus 
11 France  Germany  Italy  Czech  Rep. 
12 Germany  Luxembourg Germany  Belgium 
13 Austria  France  Malta  Portugal 
14 Portugal  Sweden  Cyprus  Netherlands 
15 Greece  Finland  Austria  Denmark 
16     Slovenia Germany 
17     Slovakia Luxembourg 
18     Estonia France 
19    Latvia  Greece 
20    Lithuania  Austria 
21    Czech  Rep.  Poland 
22    Portugal  Sweden 
23    Bulgaria  Finland 
24    Hungary  Latvia 
25    Greece  Lithuania 16 
 
26    Poland  Hungary 
27    Romania  Bulgaria 
average 98.825 79.853  98.616  74.174 
median 98.778 77.500 98.479 74.900 
stand.dev.  0.364 16.172 0.365 22.660 
 
 Finally, in order to test the differences in the efficiency results in two specific periods that 
coincide both with the implementation of the EMU and with the last EU enlargement, we 
apply the DEA estimates for the two panels of countries (EU-15 and EU-27) during two time 
sub-periods: 2000-2008 and 2004-2008. The average results
2 are presented below in Table 6, 
where we also include the average results for the entire time period (1994-2008). These 
results allow us to conclude that the EU enlargement not only increased heterogeneity (the 
standard deviations are always greater in the EU-27 panels), but also contributed to the 
decrease of the average and the median of the efficiency scores.  
Furthermore, and again according to the results reported in Table 6, for both panels (EU-15 
and EU-27), there has been an increase in efficiency since the implementation of the EMU 
(the results for the time period 2000-2008 are always higher than those for the entire period, 
1994-2008). However, efficiency decreased slightly after the most recent EU enlargement 
process (the results for the period 2004-2008 are inferior to those obtained for 2000-2008). 
 
Table 6 –DEA average efficiency by panels and time periods  
  1994-2008 2000-2008 2004-2008 
  EU-15 EU-27 EU-15 EU-27 EU-15 EU-27 
Average  79.853 74.174 82.953 81.033 82.013 80.589 
Median  77.500 74.900 82.600 82.400 82.200 83.300 




                                                           
2 In order to save space, the country-specific results are not presented in this paper, but will be provided 
on request. 17 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The  two approaches to efficiency measurement, SFA and DEA, rely on the concept of 
efficiency that relates, in a production function, the allocation of scarce resources or inputs to 
the obtained results or outputs defining the production possibility frontier. Thus, with both 
approaches, technical efficiency is always a relative measure of the distance to the frontier 
and depends on the specific inputs and outputs and the definition of the production function. 
The SFA approach is a parametric method that requires the econometric estimation of the 
(cost or profit) function. One of its main advantages is to allow the decomposition of the 
deviations from the efficient frontier between the stochastic error and pure inefficiency. 
Another important advantage of this approach is the guarantee that if we include an irrelevant 
variable in the function, the method will detect this irrelevance and the variable will have a 
very low or even zero weight in the definition of the efficiency results.  
On the other hand, the DEA approach may be more flexible, as it does not require the 
estimation of any econometric function.  One of its main advantages is to provide efficiency 
scores even in the presence of relatively few observations, since for each situation, DEA will 
take the available data to define the efficiency frontier with the combinations of the best-
practice observations. All production units are situated either on or below the defined 
efficiency frontier and the efficiency measure is simply the distance of each production unit to 
the frontier.   
So, the natures of these two approaches are very different and even when they are estimating 
the underlying efficiency values of the same production units, using the same inputs to 
produce the same outputs, SFA and DEA can provide different efficiency scores for some or 
even all the units under analysis. As each method has its own advantages, neither of them 
provides results that can be considered, for all data sets, much better than the results obtained 
with the other one.  18 
 
In this paper, we chose to use both the SFA and DEA approaches and, when possible, we 
compare their results. Following the intermediation approach, we take into account the 
available data and the specific character of the bank production activities and consider three 
inputs (total loans, total securities and other earning assets) and the prices of three outputs 
(borrowed funds, physical capital and labour). For the application of the SFA, we opt to 
estimate stochastic cost frontier (SCF) functions and suppose that the total cost depends on 
three other explanatory variables:  the number of banks, the equity ratio and the ratio revenue 
over expenses.  
We took our data from the Bankscope database, which is universally recognised as one of the 
most appropriate banking data sources as it guarantees standardisation and comparability and 
provides data on banks accounting for 90% of total bank assets. Nevertheless, in spite of its 
recognised advantages, Bankscope data can still be very unbalanced, at least insofar as the 
number of included banks is concerned. In this paper, we use the available data from the 
consolidated accounts of the commercial and savings banks of all EU countries for the time 
period 1994-2008. Approximately 30% of the included banks are from one country 
(Germany), while the banks of four countries (Germany, France, Italy and UK) account for 
half of all the banks considered (see Appendix III). The main argument is that this reflects the 
reality of European banking, with the dominant power of the rich, large countries. On the 
other hand, even when we recognise that the number of banks can be important, we should 
also take into account their weight and the degree of concentration in the specific bank 
market.  
Another important issue concerns the variables used. As Bankscope does not directly provide 
the prices of the production inputs, we consider proxies of these prices. For the price of the 
borrowed funds, we took the ratio interest expense over the sum of deposits; for physical 
capital, the ratio of the non-interest expenses over fixed assets; and for the price of labour, the 19 
 
ratio personnel expenses over the number of employees. This may be one of the explanations 
for the unexpected signals that we obtained for the influence of the labour and capital in the 
total cost in the estimated cost frontier functions. Another possible reason stems from the 
specificity of the banking production process, which actually depends much more on the 
borrowed funds that on the traditional production factors. 
The estimated SCF function also confirms that the total cost depends on the chosen outputs. It 
mostly increases with the provided securities and the other earning assets, as well as with the 
total loans, although less clearly. As for the other explanatory variables included in the cost 
function, the results confirm that total cost clearly increases with the equity ratio and 
decreases with the ratio revenue over expenses. 
Furthermore, the results obtained with the SCF function confirm the existence of statistically 
important technical inefficiencies and that these inefficiencies increase with the inclusion of 
the new EU member-states, since all of the countries have had to adapt to the new competitive 
conditions of the enlarged market. 
These results are also confirmed by the DEA approach, which clearly shows that efficiency 
decreased with the inclusion of the new EU member-states. Furthermore, the DEA results 
allow us to analyse the evolution of the efficiency scores after the implementation of EMU 
(2000-2008) and in the years after the recent EU enlargement (2004-2008). Concentrating on 
the average levels of efficiency, we may conclude that while the implementation of the EMU 
has contributed to an increase of bank efficiency, the contrary appears to have happened more 
recently with the enlargement process. In line with these conclusions, the country ranking 
positions obtained with SCF estimates clearly show that most of the new member-states are 
situated below the average efficiency scores, together with some “old” EU members which 
have faced difficulties in the process of adaptation to the new, enlarged market conditions. 20 
 
Moreover, the comparison of the results obtained with SCF and DEA country efficiency 
rankings allows us to conclude that, in spite of the different methodologies, and with few 
exceptions, countries that are well-classified with one approach are also in a good position 
with the other approach, and vice versa. 
Thus, even if it is true that European integration may contribute to the increase of the average 
efficiency scores, some EU members are still facing difficulties to catch up with the levels of 
the best performers. Nevertheless, our convergence estimates confirm that there is a clear 
convergence process among EU members, although the pace continues to be very slow, with 
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APPENDIX I – Panel stochastic frontier models 
 
For panel data models, and particularly with stochastic frontier models, it is necessary not 
only to suppose the normality for the noise error term (v) and half- or truncated normality for 
the inefficiency error term (u), but also to assume that the firm-specific level of inefficiency is 
uncorrelated with the input levels. This type of model also addresses the fundamental question 
of whether and how inefficiencies vary over time.  
Following Battese and Coelli (2008) and Battese et al. (1989), a general panel stochastic 
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So, as Ti increases, γi will decrease. If Ti →∞ , γi → 0, so  i i u → −ε  and there are clear 




APPENDIX II – Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
DEA was originally presented in the paper of Charles et al. (1978), assuming constant 
returns to scale, which can be accepted as optimal but only in the long run.  Later, Banker 
et al. (1984) introduced an additional convexity constraint (λ) and allowed for variable 
returns to scale.  
Following Banker et al. (1984), we can assume that at any time t, there are N decision-
making units (DMUs) that use a set of X inputs (X = x1, x2, ..., xk) to produce a set of  Y 
outputs (Y = y1, y2, ..., ym), thus obtaining the DEA input-oriented efficiency measure of 
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APPENDIX III – Number of banks (and %) by country 
 
 
Country  1994 2000 2008  Average   
(1994-2008) 
Austria  54  (2.34)  129  (4.92)  147  (6.92)  127  (4.90) 
Belgium  88  (3.82)  68  (2.60)    34  (1.60)    72  (2.78) 
Bulgaria  10  (0.43)   25  (0.95)    21  (0.99)  23  (0.89) 
Cyprus  12  (0.52)  23  (0.88)    9  (0.42)  18  (0.69) 
Czech Rep.  24  (1.04) 27  (1.03)    20  (0.94)  26  (1.00) 
Denmark  98  (4.25)  123  (4.69)  109  (5.13)  116  (4.48) 
Estonia  9  (0.39)  10  (0.38)  10  (0.47)  11  (0.42) 
Finland  11  (0.48)  14  (0.53)  12  (0.56)  13  (0.50) 
France  350  (15.18)  308  (11.76)  204  (9.60)  297  (11.46) 
Germany  786  (34.08)  771  (29.43)  593  (27.92)  738  (28.48) 
Greece  25  (1.08)  26  (0.99)  29  (1.37)  32  (1.24) 
Hungary  30  (1.30)  39  (1.49)  26  (1.22)  34  (1.31) 
Ireland  24  (1.04)  42  (1.60)  40  (1.88)  42  (1.62) 
Italy  177  (7.68)  216  (8 .24)  199  (9.37)  231  (8.92) 
Latvia  16  (0.69)  25  (0.95)  33  (1.55)  27  (1.04) 
Lithuania  7  (0.30)  16  (0.61)  15  (0.71)  14  (0.54) 
Luxembourg  118  (5.12)  112  (4.27)  80  (3.77)  106  (4.09) 
Malta  8  (0.35)  10  (0.38)  14  (0.66)  12  (0.46) 
Netherlands  50  (2.17)  50  (1.91)  41  (1.93)  57  (2.20) 
Poland  33  (1.43)  50  (1.91)  37  (1.74)  48  (1.85) 
Portugal  34  (1.47)  37  (1.41)  25  (1.18)  36  (1.39) 
Romania  3  (0.13)  31  (1.18)  27  (1.27)  23  (0.89) 
Slovakia  11  (0.48)  22  (0.84)  16  (0.75)  19  (0.73) 
Slovenia  14  (0.61)  25  (0.95)  21  (0.99)  23  (0.89) 
Spain  172  (7.46)  204  (7.79)  136  (6.40)  196  (7.56) 
Sweden  14  (0.61)  22  (0.84)  78  (3.67)  60  (2.32) 
UK  128  (5.55)  195  (7.44)  148  (6.97)  190  (7.33) 
TOTAL  2306 2620    2124 2591 
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APPENDIX IV – Estimates with Cost Frontier Function  
 
PANEL 1 - 15 EU countries 
(1994 – 2008) 
PANEL 2 - 27 EU countries 
(1994 – 2008) 
Variable  Model I  Model II  Variable  Model I  Model II 
W1:     W1:    
coefficient .7978371  .7182306  coefficient .8743844  .8159698 
z 5.99  6.59  z 8.33  8.72 
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
W2:     W2:    
coefficient -.4135728      -.3531588  coefficient -6.864385 -.7367332 
z -3.45  -4.08  z -6.18  -7.13 
P>|z| 0.001  0.000  P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
W3:     W3:    
coefficient -.1162695 -.0858007  coefficient -.1191528 -.1065062 
z -2.43  -2.00  z -3.33  -3.46 
P>|z| 0.015  0.045  P>|z| 0.001  0.001 
Y1:     Y1:    
coefficient -.1072872    coefficient .3433489  .3308214 
z -0.89    z 5.65  10.66 
P>|z| 0.376    P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
Y2:     Y2:    
coefficient .1749893    coefficient .103594   
z 0.81    z 1.42   
P>|z| 0.418    P>|z| 0.157   
Y3:     Y3:    
coefficient .7515762 .08218408  coefficient .3294587  .457603 
z 3.03  30.54  z 3.24  17.01 
P>|z| 0.002  0.000  P>|z| 0.001  0.000 
P1:     P1:    
coefficient -.2089033 -.1765455  coefficient -.0447659 -.0470006 
z -5.15  -25.26  z -2.39  -5.66 
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  P>|z| 0.017  0.000 
P2:     P2:    
coefficient .0894457  .0313571  coefficient .0566359 .0308515 
z 1.21  2.48  z 2.71  5.77 
P>|z| 0.228  0.013  P>|z| 0.007  0.000 
P3:     P3:    
coefficient .1058051  .1342023  coefficient  -0.304238   
z 1.25  7.23  z  -1.06   
P>|z| 0.212  0.000  P>|z| 0.288   
P4:     P4:    
coefficient .0753658  .09093  coefficient .000928   
z 2.21  3.76  z 0.05   
P>|z| 0.027  0.000  P>|z| .964   
P5:     P5:    
coefficient -.1099221 -.0777023  coefficient -.1232773 -.1395303 
z -2.25  -3.05  z -3.73  -5.03 
P>|z| 0.025  0.002  P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
P6:     P6:    
coefficient .0505409    coefficient .1639128 .1834019 
z 0.74    z 3.96  6.12 
P>|z| 0.461    P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
P7:     P7:    
coefficient -.0054226    coefficient -.011956  -.0106709 
z -0.80    z -2.24  -2.06 
P>|z| 0.461    P>|z| 0.025  0.040 
P8:     P8:    
coefficient -.0342686 -.0344847  coefficient -.005493   
z -2.82  -2.95  z -0.68   
P>|z| 0.005  0.003  P>|z| 0.495   
P9:     P9:    
coefficient .0455189  .0379471  coefficient  .02441  .0170957 26 
 
z 3.10  3.02  z 2.21  3.06 
P>|z| 0.002  0.002  P>|z| 0.027  0.002 
Z1:     O1:    
coefficient -.0316589 -.0329478  coefficient -.0006337   
z -1.61  -1.80  z -0.03   
P>|z| 0.107  0.071  P>|z| 0.974   
Z2:     O2:    
coefficient .1961499  .2154676  coefficient .0854296 .0819597 
z 4.78  5.77  z 3.77  3.64 
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
Z3:     O3:    
coefficient -1.010373 -.9939596  coefficient -.7982632 -.7986451 
z -8.27  -8.19  z  -12.15  -12.17 
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
        
mu     mu    
coefficient 2.952165  2.8636  coefficient 3.533474 3.254799 
z 6.50  7.00  z 8.85  9.40 
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  P>|z| 0.000  0.001 
            
lnsigma2     lnsigma2     
coefficient -1.766562  -1.65176  coefficient -.945118  -.9713751 
z -4.00  -3.87  z -3.35  -3.48 
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  P>|z| 0.001  0.001 
         
ilgtgamma     ilgtgamma     
Coefficient 3.635433  3.748892  Coefficient 3.908464  3.873654 
z 7.66  8.19  z  13.05  13.09 
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  P>|z| 0.000  0.000 
         
sigma2     sigma2    
Coefficient  .1709196 .1917123  Coefficient  .3886337  .3785621 
Standard error  .0754052  .0819039  Standard error  .1097808  .1056769 
          
gamma      gamma    
Coefficient  .9743051 .9769977  Coefficient  .9803236 .9796408 
Standard  error .0118859 0.0102856 Standard error  .0057757  .0059013 
          
sigma_u2      sigma_u2    
Coefficient  .1665279 .1873025  Coefficient  .3809868 .3708549 
Standard error  .0754535  .0819444  Standard error  .1097962  .105689 
          
sigma_v2      sigma_v2    
Coefficient  .0043918 .0044098  Coefficient  .0076469 .0077072 
Standard error  .0004367  .0004369  Standard error  .0005586  .0005625 
         
Wald chi2  6653.75 6642.71  Wald chi2  13032.10 12927.96 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
         
Log likelihood  243.80243 242.49131 Log likelihood  322.8634 321.74196 
N  225 225  N  405 405 
 
(*) TC = Total cost (dependent variable) = natural logarithm of the sum of the interest expenses plus the total operating 
expenses  
 
Inputs: W1 = Price of the borrowed funds = natural logarithm of the ratio interest expenses over the sum of deposits;  
             W2 = Price of physical capital = natural logarithm of the ratio noninterest expenses over fixed assets 
                    W3 = Price of labour = natural logarithm of the ratio personnel expenses over the number of employees 
  
Outputs: Y1 = Total loans = natural logarithm of the loans 
 Y2 = Total securities = natural logarithm of the total securities 
  Y3 = Other earning assets = natural logarithm of the difference between the total earning assets and the 
total loans 27 
 
Products  of Inputs and  Outputs:  P1  = W1 * Y1; P2  = W1 * Y2 ; P3  = W1 * Y2 ; P4  = W2 * Y1 ; P5  = W2 * Y2 ; P6  = 
W2*Y3 ; P7  = W3 * Y1 ; P8  = W3 * Y2 ; P9  = W3 * Y3 
 
Other variables: Z1 = Number of companies = natural logarithm of the number of companies included 
            Z2 = Equity ratio = natural logarithm of the ratio equity over total assets 
                     Z3 = Ratio revenue over expenses = natural logarithm of the ratio of the total revenue over 


























1 Ireland  100.000 Finland    100.000 
2 Finland    98.990 Ireland  98.987 
3  Denmark 98.952  Denmark 98.971 
4 Netherlands  98.874 Sweden  98.905 
5 Sweden  98.867 Netherlands  98.869 
6  UK 98.801  UK 98.785 
7 Spain  98.786 Luxembourg  98.784 
8 Luxembourg  98.778 Belgium  98.777 
9 Belgium  98.768 Spain  98.760 
10 Italy  98.736 France  98.733 
11 France  98.712 Italy  98.729 
12  Germany 98.678  Germany 98.720 
13 Austria  98.573 Malta  98.559 
14 Portugal  98.445 Cyprus  98.479 
15 Greece  98.409 Austria  98.474 
16     Slovenia 98.446 
17     Slovakia 98.411 
18     Estonia 98.402 
19    Latvia  98.394 
20    Lithuania  98.378 
21    Czech  Rep.  98.348 
22    Portugal  98.331 
23    Bulgaria  98.329 
24    Hungary  98.286 
25    Greece  98.284 
26    Poland  98.274 
27    Romania  98.211 
average   98.825   98.616 
median   98.778   98.479 










Appendix VI – Estimates with input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis 





















1 Ireland  100.00  Estonia  100.00 
2 Portugal  100.00  Ireland  100.00 
3 Spain  100.00  Malta  100.00 
4 UK  100.00  Slovakia  100.00 
5 Italy  95.80  Spain  100.00 
6 Greece  84.40  Slovenia  97.60 
7 Belgium  81.60  Romania  97.40 
8 Austria  77.50  UK  96.40 
9 Netherlands  75.50  Italy  95.80 
10 Denmark  73.70  Cyprus  88.70 
11 Germany  70.50  Czech  Rep.  87.40 
12 Luxembourg  68.80  Belgium  81.50 
13 France  66.20  Portugal  76.40 
14 Sweden  52.00  Netherlands  74.90 
15 Finland  51.80  Denmark  73.50 
16     Germany 70.40 
17     Luxembourg 68.20 
18     France 66.20 
19     Greece  64.20 
20     Austria  63.80 
21     Poland  58.70 
22     Sweden  52.00 
23     Finland  49.30 
24     Latvia  43.00 
25     Lithuania  40.30 
26     Hungary  34.50 
27     Bulgaria  22.50 
average   79.853    74.174 
median   77.500    74.900 
stand.dev.   16.172    22.660 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 